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Comment
Contractual Excuse Based On a Failure of
Presupposed Conditions
The issue: Under what circumstances and to what extent will a
seller be excused from the performance of his contractual obligation
under § 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code?'
In light of the decreasing availability of natural resources and of
the increasing governmental control in all phases of industry, this
issue is rapidly rising to the forefront for industrial suppliers and
consumers. The variety of factual situations under which it can arise
are too numerous for description;2 however, beyond the factual dis-
tinctions lie the determinative legal concepts. The foreseeability of
the contingency, the seller's fault in causing the alleged contin-
gency, and the impracticability of performance are three concepts
which are relied upon by the courts in determining excuse under §
2-615 of the Code. The use and misuse of these concepts will be the
subject of discussion in part II of this comment. Part I will examine
the interpretive problems created by the text of the Code. The goal
of this comment is to establish a procedure for determining the
validity of an alleged § 2-615 excuse.
I. THE CODE
Section 2-615, captioned "Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Con-
ditions," 3 provides the legal parameters for determining when con-
1. Hereafter referred to as the Code or the UCC.
2. The following simplistic hypotheticals are posed to add a sense of reality to the issue.
(1) Oil Supplier Corporation enters requirements contract with Consumer Corpora-
tion. Due to the actions of a foreign government, Supplier Corporation cannot fulfill
its contractual obligations.
(2) Coal Supplier Corporation enters into long term supply contracts with several
consumer corporations. Due to the effects of environmental controls, Supplier Corpora-
tion's production has been substantially impaired and it cannot comply with its con-
tractual commitments.
(3) Mineral Supplier Corporation contracts to supply Manufacturing Corporation
with definite quantities of minerals at specified prices. Due to new conservation regula-
tions, Supplier Corporation's costs are dramatically increased.
3. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615 provides as follows:
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tractual performance will be excused.4 For the purpose of analysis,
this section can be divided into five parts.
A. Preliminary Restriction
The Code imposes a preliminary restriction upon the application
of § 2-615 excuse: Except so far as a seller may have assumed a
greater obligation . . . .5 This phrase appears to be self explana-
tory; however, when read in conjunction with § 2-615(a) and Com-
ment 8,1 an interpretation problem is presented. Comment 8 ex-
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to the
preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who complies with
paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if
performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a con-
tingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the con-
tract was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or
domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be
invalid.
(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part of the seller's
capacity to perform, he must allocate production and deliveries among his cus-
tomers but may at his option include regular customers not then under contract
as well as his own requirements for further manufacture. He may so allocate in
any manner which is fair and reasonable.
(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will be delay or non-
delivery and, when allocation is required under paragraph (b), of the estimated
quota thus made available for the buyer.
4. The early common law did not excuse contractual performance on the basis of super-
vening impossibility. See, e.g., Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1681). Later, the
courts adopted an "implied condition" fiction to avoid unjust results in impossibility situa-
tions. See, e.g., Krell v. Henry, [19031 2 K.B. 740 (C.A.) (Coronation Cases). The UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-615, 2-616 consolidates the earlier rules set forth in the RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS §§ 454-69 (1932) and updates them in light of commercial standards. Because
the Code is the controlling law in forty-nine states and in the District of Columbia, the scope
of this comment is limited to an examination of the Code's application. For the development
of the law in this area see Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 12 (1962); Comment, The Development of the
Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 18 MICH. L. REV. 589 (1920). See also Comment,
Energy Crisis and Economic Impossibility in Louisiana Fuel Requirement Contracts: A
Gameplan for Reform, 49 TuL. L. REv. 605 (1975) (impossibility concepts in civil law).
5. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615. Hereafter referred to as the preliminary restriction.
6. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 8 provides:
The provisions of this section are made subject to assumption of greater liability by
agreement and such agreement is to be found not only in the expressed terms of the
contract but in the circumstances surrounding the contracting, in trade usage and the
like. Thus the exemptions of this section do not apply when the contingency in ques-
tion is sufficiently foreshadowed at the time of contracting to be included among the
business risks which are fairly to be regarded as part of the dickered terms, either
consciously or as a matter of reasonable, commercial interpretation from the circum-
stances. See Madeirense Do Brasil S./A. v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber Co., 147 F.2d 399
(2d Cir. 1945). The exemption otherwise present through usage of trade under the
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plains7 that the provisions of § 2-615 are subject to the assumption
of greater liability by "agreement." This "agreement" can either be
expressly contractual or can be implied from the circumstances sur-
rounding the contract. Thus, the preliminary restriction includes
implied assumptions of liability.
The problem with this interpretation is that it renders the prelim-
inary restriction repetitive of and perhaps contradictory to the
terms of § 2-615(a).8 The first basis for excuse under § 2-615(a) is
impracticability of performance due to the occurrence of a contin-
gency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which
the contract was made. The concept of foreseeability is a controlling
factor in the delegation of contractual risks.' Thus, under the first
test of § 2-615(a), a foreseeable contingency would be strong evi-
dence that the non-occurrence of the contingency was not a basic
assumption upon which the contract was made. Furthermore, a
foreseeable contingency is also strong evidence that the seller may
have assumed an obligation to perform greater than that expressly
provided by the contract.'" Thus, in a case of a foreseeable contin-
gency, a § 2-615 excuse would be negated both under the prelimi-
nary restriction and under the first test of § 2-615(a). In this sense,
the preliminary restriction is repetitive.
The second basis for excuse under § 2-615(a) is "by compliance
present section may also be expressly negated by the language of the agreement.
Generally, express agreements as to exemptions designed to enlarge upon or supplant
the provisions of this section are to be read in the light of mercantile sense and reason,
for this section itself sets up the commercial standard for normal and reasonable
interpretation and provides a minimum beyond which agreement may not go.
Agreement can also be made in regard to the consequences of exemption as laid down
in paragraphs (b) and (c) and the next section on procedure on notice claiming excuse.
7. Although the comments to the UCC are not statutory material and therefore not legally
controlling, they are essential to a proper interpretation of the Code's provisions.
8. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615(a) provides in part:
Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part . ..is not a breach . .. if
performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contin-
gency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable. . . governmental regulation
Id. (emphasis added).
9. Foreseeability is one of those types of legal concepts impossible to strictly define.
Therefore, it is better to view it in terms of a graphic scale with absolute foreseeability on
one end and absolute unforeseeability at the other.
10. The foreseeability of the contingency is part of the commercial circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction from which Comment 8 allows an implied assumption of greater
liability to be drawn.
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in good faith with any applicable governmental regulation or order
. . . ." Under this test, the foreseeability of the regulation or order
does not appear to be a factor. Thus, to impose an implied assump-
tion of liability based on foreseeability could be interpreted as con-
tradictory to the literal terms of this § 2-615(a) test. However, Com-
ment 8 appears to subject all of the provisions of § 2-615 to both
express and implied assumptions of liability. Furthermore, § 1-109
provides that section captions are part of the Code. As earlier
stated, the caption to § 2-615 is "Excuse by Failure of Presupposed
Conditions." This caption supports an argument that excuse, under
the governmental regulation test, should be limited by implied as-
sumptions of liability. If a governmental order was foreseeable, its
nonexistence could not have been a presupposed condition. There-
fore, the preliminary restriction should not be read as contradictory
to the terms of § 2-615(a)." This result is justifiable by the Code's
stress on the commercial circumstances of the transaction. If the
commercial circumstances, including the foreseeability of the con-
tingency, prove an assumption of liability by the seller, there should
be no excuse of performance. 3 There does not appear to be any
overriding public policy interests which should change the result
merely because the alleged excuse is based on a governmental order
rather than some other type of contingency.
B. Contingency - Basic Assumption - Impracticability
Section 2-615(a) provides for contractual excuse if: performance
as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a con-
tingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made . . . . '1 Excuse under this clause
should be found only if the following three questions can be
answered affirmatively:
(1) Has a contingency occurred?
(2) Was its non-occurrence a basic assumption upon which
the contract was made?
11. The fact that the preliminary restriction is repetitive should be overlooked as either
a drafting error or as intentional duplicity.
12. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 1 ("commercially impractica-
ble"), Comment 3 ("the commercial character of the criterion").
13. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 8.
14. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615(a).
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(3) Has the contingency rendered the agreed performance
impracticable?
Although the comments provide some guidelines for the meanings
of the terms "contingency," "basic assumption," and "impractica-
ble,"' 5 their interpretation in specific situations is left to the courts.
Comment 2 to § 2-615 states that the section purposely refrains from
attempting an exhaustive expression of contingencies and it is to be
interpreted in light of its underlying reason and purpose. Presuma-
bly, the purpose of the section is consistent with that of the entire
Code, "to use equitable principles in furtherance of commercial
standards and good faith."' 6 Because the interpretive problems
raised by § 2-615(a) are definitional ones,' 7 they will be discussed
later in conjunction with the relevant precedents.
C. Governmental Regulations
The second clause of § 2-615(a) provides for contractual excuse if
performance as agreed has been made impracticable: by compliance
in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental
regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.1' The
basic interpretive problem of this clause was raised in reference to
the preliminary restriction placed on excuse. This clause, if read
15. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 1 states in part:
This section excuses a seller from timely delivery of goods contracted for, where his
performance has become commercially impracticable because of unforeseen superven-
ing circumstances not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contract-
ing.
Id. (emphasis added).
Comment 3 states that the Code's impracticability standard goes beyond impossibility of
performance and accepts the less stringent commercial impracticability standard. Comment
4 provides as follows:
Increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due to
some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the performance.
Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in itself a justification, for that is exactly
the type of business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are intended
to cover. But a severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to a contingency
such as war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of major sources of
supply or the like, which either causes a marked increase in cost or altogether prevents
the seller from securing supplies necessary to his performance, is within the contempla-
tion of this section.
16. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 6.
17. The problem of this clause being repetitive of the introductory restriction on excuse
was discussed earlier. See text accompanying notes 7-11 supra.
18. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615(a).
Duquesne Law Review
alone, would allow excuse based on compliance with governmental
regulations without an examination of the basic assumptions to the
contract. 9 However, as earlier argued, this reading of the clause is
inconsistent with the preliminary restriction, the comments, and
the underlying purpose of the Code. If a governmental order and its
effects were absolutely foreseeable at the execution of the contract,
there should be no excuse under the Code. 0 First, the foreseeability
of the contingency would amount to an implied assumption of an
obligation to perform, regardless of the governmental order. Second,
to allow excuse under these circumstances would be contrary to the
Code's purpose of furthering commercial standards and good faith
by the use of equitable principles.2' The policy behind the Code
would therefore appear to require an examination of foreseeability
for every alleged § 2-615 excuse. The concepts of foreseeability and
"a basic assumption upon which the contract was made" are closely
related. Furthermore, both concepts may be equivalent to the pre-
liminary restriction to § 2-615. Therefore, there are two methods by
which a foreseeability restriction can be read into the governmental
order excuse clause. Either the introductory restriction can be used
to examine the foreseeability of the order as an assumption of
greater liability, or the basic assumption test of the first clause of §
2-615(a) can be inferred for the second clause. Either method should
produce the same result: an examination of the contracting circum-
stances to determine if the governmental order should justifiably
excuse performance. 2
19. Professor James J. White concludes that this obvious reading of the clause is the
correct one:
If performance is rendered impracticable by a governmental regulation or order, seller
is freed from his obligation without reference to the language concerning contingency
and basic assumption.
White, Impossibility, Impracticability, and Supervening Illegality, 108 PRAC. L. INST. 9, 12
(Green ed. 1974).
20. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 10. See note 22 infra. Apparently, this
proposition has been accepted by some courts. See, e.g., Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974), where the court considered the foreseeability of govern-
ment regulations.
21. In good faith and equity, a seller who foresaw a governmental order and its effects
should not be excused from the performance of a contract he entered into with that knowl-
edge. Certainly he should bear the risk which he foresaw.
22. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 10 states in part that:
governmental interference cannot excuse [performance] unless it truly "supervenes"
in such a manner as to be beyond the seller's assumption of risk. And any action by
the party claiming excuse which causes or colludes in inducing the governmental
Vol. 14: 235
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D. Allocation Requirements
Section 2-615(b) provides the Code's allocation requirements:
Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part of
seller's capacity to perform, he must allocate production and deliv-
eries among his customers but may at his option include regular
customers not then under contract as well as his own requirements
for further manufacture. He may allocate in any manner which is
fair and reasonable.2" Inherent in the structure of § 2-615 is the
requirement of establishing a valid excuse under § 2-615(a) prior to
an examination of the allocation." The allocation requirement is
based on two principles: (a) an excused seller must fulfill his con-
tracts to the extent permitted by the supervening contingency; and
(b) every reasonable business leeway in deciding the allocation is
given to the seller. 5 The Code's directives in this area are clear.
First, the seller must consider every customer when he supplies one
or when he allocates production to himself. Second, regular custom-
ers, not under contract, may be supplied but with extreme caution
so as not to allow price to control allocation. The major issue under
this provision will be a factual one. What constitutes a "fair and
reasonable" allocation? The Code provides no specific guidelines.'
action preventing his performance would be in breach of good faith and would destroy
his exemption.
23. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615(b).
24. See note 3 supra. See also text accompanying note 53 infra.
25. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 11 provides:
An excused seller must fulfill his contract to the extent which the supervening
contingency permits, and if the situation is such that his customers are generally
affected he must take account of all in supplying one. Subsections (a) and (b), there-
fore, explicitly permit in any proration a fair and reasonable attention to the needs of
regular customers who are probably relying on spot orders for supplies. Customers at
different stages of the manufacturing process may be fairly treated by including the
seller's manufacturing requirements. A fortiori, the seller may also take account of
contracts later in date than the one in question. The fact that such spot orders may
be closed at an advanced price causes no difficulty, since any allocation which exceeds
normal past requirements will not be reasonable. However, good faith requires, when
prices have advanced, that the seller exercise real care in making his allocation, and
in case of doubt his contract customers should be favored and supplies prorated evenly
among them regardless of price. Save for the extra care thus required by changes in
the market, this section seeks to leave every reasonable business leeway to the seller.
Id. (emphasis added).
26. The only case in which the duty to allocate has been examined is Mansfield Propane
Gas Co. v. Folger Gas Co., 231 Ga. 868, 204 S.E.2d 625 (1974). The Georgia Supreme Court
held that the duty to allocate applied unless the contract affirmatively provided otherwise.
Furthermore, the court held that the issue of a "fair and reasonable" allocation is a factual
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However, it is suggested that the following factors should be exam-
ined in determining whether an allocation is fair and reasonable:
(1) the percentage of seller's production required by the con-
tract prior to the contingency;
(2) the percentage of seller's production required by other
contract customers prior to the contingency;
(3) the percentage of seller's production that remained for
regular non-contract customers prior to the contingency;
(4) the percentage of seller's production allocated to his own
use prior to the contingency; and
(5) the sale prices to both contract and non-contract custom-
ers prior to the contingency.
These percentages and prices should be compared to their post-
contingency equivalents under the seller's allocation program. If the
percentage of seller's production available to non-contract custom-
ers has increased, it is evidence that the seller may be taking advan-
tage of an increase in market price by increasing sales to non-
contract customers.27 Similarly, if the seller is allocating a greater
percentage of his production to other contract customers, an exami-
nation of the contract prices of the other customers will determine
if the seller is using the contingency to his advantage by increasing
sales to higher priced contract customers. If these factors are exam-
ined in light of the Code's good faith requirements, the purpose of
§ 2-615 in requiring allocation should be fulfilled.28
E. Seller's Seasonable Notification & § 2-616
The Code in § 2-615(c) provides: The seller must notify the buyer
seasonably that there will be delay or non-delivery and, when allo-
cation is required under paragraph (b), of the estimated quota thus
made available for the buyer.2" This section must be read in con-
junction with § 2-616, captioned "Procedure on Notice Claiming
Excuse."30 Together, these sections provide certainty of result when
one. The court stated that the amount of the product allocated and the cost of the product
to the seller should be the determinative factors.
27. Non-contract customers would be paying the rising market price while contract cus-
tomers would have the seller "tied" to a particular contract price.
28. Although the Code does not mandate a precise pro-rata allocation based on pre-
contingency distribution percentages, the comparisons of the suggested criteria will provide
a basis for determining if an allocation is "fair and reasonable."
29. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615(c).
30. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-616 provides as follows:
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a justified excuse is claimed by the seller." When a seller seasonably
notifies a buyer of a proper § 2-615 excuse, only two courses of action
are available to the buyer: (1) termination of the contract, affirma-
tively or by inaction; or (2) contract modification according to
seller's allocation.2 The Code has thus eliminated the confusion
which resulted from the separate treatment of temporary and par-
tial impossibility recognized under the Restatement of Contracts."
Under these separate principles of temporary and partial impossi-
bility, it was often difficult to determine the result after a finding
of excuse. In contrast, the Code provides one comprehensive test for
determining the validity of the excuse and a separate section assur-
ing the result after a finding of validity. 4 In this manner, the Code
achieves its purpose of improving upon the Restatement by attain-
ing commercial predictability." If there is a valid claim of excuse
(1) Where the buyer receives notification of a material or indefinite delay or an
allocation justified under the preceding section he may be written notification to the
seller as to any delivery concened, and where the prospective deficiency substantially
impairs the value of the whole contract under the provisions of this Article relating to
breach of installment contracts (Section 2-612), then also as to the whole,
(a) terminate and thereby discharge any unexecuted portion of the con-
tract; or
(b) modify the contract by agreeing to take his available quota in substi-
tution.
(2) If after receipt of such notification from the seller the buyer fails so to modify
the contract within a reasonable time not exceeding thirty days the contract lapses
with respect to any deliveries affected.
(3) The provisions of this section may not be negated by agreement except in so
far as the seller has assumed a greater obligation under the preceding section.
31. An interesting aside, beyond the scope of this comment, is the application of § 2-615
to a buyer. Although the Code speaks strictly in terms of excuse for the seller, Comment 9
provides that in the proper situations, "the reason of the present section may well apply and
entitle the buyer to the exemption." Furthermore, if a court is not convinced of this argument,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-103, captioned "Supplementary General Principles of Law
Applicable," can be used to introduce the principles of § 2-615 to excuse a buyer under the
proper factual situations.
32. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-616; see 2 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
2-616.6 (2d ed. 1971).
33. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 462-63 (1932). The difficulty created by the Restate-
ment stemmed from the procedure which it provided. First, it attempted to categorize types
of impossibility (i.e., partial, temporary). Second, the result of a finding of impossibility
depended upon the category of impossibility. This procedure imposed additional factual
issues (the types of impossibility) which the Code eliminated.
34. The test for the validity of excuse is found at UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615; the
results of finding a valid excuse is codified at UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-616.
35. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-616, Comment provides in part:
This section seeks to establish simple and workable machinery for providing cer-
tainty as to when a supervening and excusing contingency "excuses" the delay, "dis-
charges" the contract, or may result in a waiver of the delay by the buyer.
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and allocation is not applicable, the only possible result is a com-
plete termination of the contract," unless otherwise agreed by the
parties. 37
A problem created by §§ 2-615(c) and 2-616 is the Code's failure
to expressly provide for the consequences of an improper claim of
excuse. Professor Anderson suggests that an unjustified claim of
excuse is a repudiation of the contract by the seller.35 If this is so, a
seller who claims excuse bears the risk that if his claim is found to
be invalid, he will be subject to the variety of remedies provided the
buyer by § 2-711 of the Code.
II. THE CASE LAW: SELLER'S CONTRIBUTORY FAULT, FORESEEABILITY
& IMPRACTICABILITY
One of the most vital analytical factors in determining the valid-
ity of an alleged § 2-615 excuse is not expressed by the text of the
Code. Case law clearly identifies as a bar to excuse the seller's
contributory fault in causing the contingency. Contributory fault
includes any type of action or inaction by the seller which disables
him from fulfilling the contract. There is no excusing contingency
if the seller was contributorily at fault in his failure to perform.
However, the Code only alludes to the concept of contributory fault
in Comment 5 to § 2-615: "there is no excuse under this section,
however, unless the seller has employed all due measures to assure
himself that his source will not fail."39 This comment aids in defin-
ing the type of "contingency" which will excuse performance. Read
literally, the comment imposes an affirmative duty upon the seller
36. See Goddard v. Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Indus. Co., 29 App. Div. 2d 754, 287
N.Y.S.2d 901 (1968). In this case defendant's factory was destroyed by fire. After the factory
had been rebuilt, plaintiff demanded performance. The court held that the destruction ex-
cused performance even after the contingency's effects had been eliminated.
37. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-616(3) may provide problems for a party attempting
to enforce a modification agreed to by both parties. The section states: "The provisions of
this section may not be negated by agreement except in so far as the seller has assumed a
greater obligation under the preceding section." Id. However, the Comment to § 2-616
states that this restriction is aimed at denying effect to "a contract clause made in advance
of trouble which would require the buyer to stand ready to take-delivery whenever the
seller is excused from delivery by unforeseen circumstances." Therefore, § 2.616(3) should
not apply to an agreement made subsequent to the supervening event.
38. 2 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-616.5 (2d ed. 1971); see UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-610, captioned "Anticipatory Repudiation."
39. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 5.
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to employ all due measures to assure himself that his source will not
fail. In its broadest sense, this duty would severely limit the avail-
ability of excuse under § 2-615. For example, a mineral supplier
whose mines have been temporarily closed due to an unforeseen
contingency could be forced to purchase on the open market to
fulfill his contract obligations. The comment could be interpreted
in this manner despite a dramatic increase in market price which
might constitute a financial threat to the existence of the supplier.
However, there is a strong argument to rebut this severe application
of the comment.
Comment 5 cites Canadian Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Mo-
lasses Co.40 and Washington Manufacturing Co. v. Midland Lumber
Co.' as examples of its application. In Dunbar the seller-defendant
breached his contract to supply buyer-plaintiff with a fixed quantity
of molasses from a specified refinery. Based upon the refinery's
cutback in production, the seller attempted to raise an impossibility
of performance defense. The court rejected the defense because the
seller did nothing to hold the refiner to the duty of continuing pro-
duction." The seller had failed to relieve itself of "the imputation
of contributory fault."43 In Midland Lumber the defendant breached
his contract to supply a specified quantity of lumber. When sued,
the defendant claimed that a government lumber embargo excused
performance. The court held that the seller had failed to exercise
"diligence and good faith in endeavoring to obtain . . . a release
. . .from the lumber embargo." 4 The seller's inaction, his failure
to act in a commercially reasonable manner, contributed to the
cause of the alleged contingency. Reading the restriction imposed
by the comment in conjunction with the holdings of these cases, the
basic principle emerges that a seller who contributes to the cause
or effect of the alleged contingency by failing to use ordinary com-
mercial measures should not be excused. It is in this sense that
Comment 5 states that a seller must employ "all due measures to
40. 258 N.Y. 194, 179 N.E. 383 (1932).
41. 113 Wash. 593, 194 P. 777 (1921).
42. 258 N.Y. at 199, 179 N.E. at 384. Seller, a middleman, had contracted to deliver to
the buyer without contracting with the refinery to assure its continued production.
43. Id.
44. 113 Wash. at 596, 194 P. at 778. The court based this conclusion on two findings of
fact: first, the seller could have fulfilled the contract by properly applying for a release from
the embargo; and second, other lumber producers had no trouble in obtaining such a release
upon a proper application.
1976
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assure himself that his source will not fail." Thus, while requiring
the seller to avoid active or passive participation in causing the
contingency, the Code does not require a seller to take extraordinary
measures to eliminate the effects of the contingency."5
The above argument can be exemplified by examining the four
following cases. In Deardorff-Jackson Co. v. National Produce Dis-
tributors, Inc.4" the complainant contracted to provide respondent
with fifty carloads of potatoes from a specific farm. When only
twenty carloads were delivered, respondent withheld payment as
damages. The judicial officer rejected complainant's argument that
the failure of the farm's production was a contingency which re-
lieved him from full performance. The officer determined that com-
plainant knew the farm could only produce a maximum of twenty-
seven carloads even though it contracted to sell fifty. After para-
phrasing Comment 5, the officer held that the complainant had not
taken adequate steps to assure its performance. Thus, Comment 5
was employed to deny excuse in a situation where the seller contrib-
uted to the cause of the alleged contingency.
In contrast to the Deardorff-Jackson decision is Low's Ezy-Fry
Potato Co. v. J. A. Wood Co.47 Here, the seller was under contract
to provide a specified type of potato from lands farmed by him.
Seller's harvest, through no fault of his own, failed to yield any of
the required potatoes. The judicial officer, citing § 2-615, held that
the seller's performance was not excused, stating:
The rule is that if the parties contemplate a sale .. .and by
reason of. . .fortuitous event, without fault of the seller, the
crop . . .fails or is destroyed, non-performance is to that ex-
tent excused .... 48
The only distinguishing feature between Deardorff and Low's is the
finding of seller's contributory fault.
Two recent cases clearly indicate that a seller's contributory fault
in causing the contingency or in increasing its effects will bar excuse
45. See note 36 supra. Similarly in the hypothetical posed in the introduction to this
discussion, the seller would not be forced to purchase in the rising market to assure his source
of supply.
46. 26 Agri. Dec. 1309, 4 UCC REP. SERV. 1164 (1967). The subsequent unreported district
court decision was vacated and remanded for factual determinations at 447 F.2d 676 (7th Cir.
1971).
47. 26 Agri. Dec. 583, 4 UCC REP. SERV. 483 (1967).
48. Id. at -, 4 UCC REP. SERV. at 485 (emphasis added).
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under § 2-615. In Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp.," the
defendant producer contracted to sell plaintiff up to 1,950 tons of
liquid oxygen per month. The defendant, when sued for failure to
fulfill its contractual obligation, presented a § 2-615 defense, claim-
ing that an explosion at its plant had lessened production capacity
rendering performance impracticable. The court, after examining
the facts surrounding the production cutback, determined that the
cause was attributable to the defendant itself.50 It appeared that the
defendant had removed equipment from the production process and
had diverted the remaining production for its own manufacturing
uses.5 In conclusion, the court stated: "A party may not, by its own
conduct, create the event causing the impracticability of perform-
ance . ,s"52
Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.5" combined the
concepts of contributory fault and foreseeability in rejecting the
seller's § 2-615 defense. The contract at issue provided that during
a one-year period defendant was to sell plaintiff a specified amount
of potash at a certain price.54 This potash, according to seller's price
49. 381 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. IlI. 1974).
50. Id. at 256.
51. Id. at 256-57. Had McLouth Steel proven a valid excuse under § 2-615(a), it could
have allocated a fair and reasonable portion of its production for its use under § 2-615(b).
52. Id.
53. 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974).
54. The contract contained a clause intended to deal with the § 2-615 situation:
The Seller shall not be liable for failure or delay in shipments or completion of a
shipment . ..when such failure or delay is caused by .. .the operation of statutes
or law, interference of civil or military authority or other causes of like or different kind
beyond the control of the seller ....
508 F.2d at 293.
This type of provision, commonly known as a force majeure clause, is incorporated in many
commercial contracts. See 4 R. HENSON & W. DAVENPORT, ULA, UCC FORMS AND MATERIALS
§ 2-615 Form 1 (1968). The effects of these broadly phrased clauses are minimal. In Texas
Gulf Sulphur, the court quoted the above clause and then ignored it. This is repeated in
numerous cases. See, e.g., Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F. Supp. 245, 256
(N.D. Ill. 1974)(excuse if "circumstances beyond .. .[the] reasonable control" of the par-
ties); Goddard v. Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Indus. Co., 29 App. Div. 2d 754, 287 N.Y.S.2d
901 (1968)(seller bound to perform "as far as it is able"). Although unstated by the courts,
the probable reason for ignoring these clauses is that their effects are inherent in the provi-
sions of § 2-615. The broadly written clauses neither add to nor subtract from the Code's
requirements. Therefore, an application of § 2-615 is equivalent to an application of the
broadly written clauses. The exception to this would be a force majeure clause which
expressly contains a greater obligation to perform than that required by § 2-615. This type of
clause would be within the scope of the preliminary restriction to § 2-615. However, it is
suggested that the extent of the obligations created by such a clause be defined in light of
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list, was to be shipped from seller's Utah mine, Canadian mine, or
warehouse. After execution of the contract, seller closed its Utah
mine and relied almost exclusively on its Canadian mine as the
source of supply. However, Canadian governmental regulations
compelled Texas Gulf Sulphur to sell potash at approximately 60%
more than the contract price. These regulations constituted the
seller's basis for raising a § 2-615 defense when buyer sued to recover
damages. Stressing the commercial circumstances of the transac-
tion, the court held that Texas Gulf Sulphur was not excused from
performance.5 5 While the court did not expressly address the ques-
tion of seller's contributory fault, the concept surfaced in its conclu-
sion. The court held that it was the decision to switch to the Cana-
dian mine, not governmental regulations, which caused the claimed
price increase."
As stated earlier, the foreseeability of the alleged excusing contin-
gency is another vital analytical factor for determining the validity
of the § 2-615 excuse. One of the three tests provided by § 2-615(a)
is that the non-occurrence of the contingency must have been a
basic assumption on which the contract was made. If a contingency
was foreseeable at the execution of the contract, its non-occurrence
might not have been an assumption upon which the contract was
made. Furthermore, under the preliminary restriction of § 2-615 the
foreseeability of the contingency is evidence that a seller assumed
an obligation to perform, regardless of the contingency. 7 In Texas
Gulf Sulphur, the court examined the foreseeability of the contin-
gency even though the opinion did not expressly formulate a foresee-
ability concept. The court reasoned that impracticability alone
would not excuse performance unless the contingency was one which
the parties assumed would not occur. Furthermore, the court con-
the provisions and purposes of § 2-615. If this approach is accepted, only an absolute assump-
tion of an obligation to perform would necessitate treatment outside the parameters of § 2-
615.
55. 508 F.2d at 294. The court stated that three conditions must be met before a party is
excused from performance by § 2-615: "(1) a contingency must occur (2) performance must
thereby be made 'impracticable' and (3) the non-occurrence of the contingency must have
been a basic assumption on which the contract was made." Id. at 293. See text prior to note
15 supra.
56. 508 F.2d at 294.
57. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL COnE § 2-615, Comment 8 and text accompanying note 5
supra.
58. 508 F.2d at 294.
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cluded that governmental controls were discernible four years prior
to the execution of the contract.59
In Mishara Construction Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp.'(
the court upheld a § 2-615 defense based on the existence of a picket
line as the excusing contingency.' In its analysis, the court formu-
lated the foreseeability concept as a restriction to excuse under § 2-
615.
The question is, given the commercial circumstances in which
the parties dealt: Was the contingency which developed one
which the parties could reasonably be thought to have foreseen
as a real possibility which could affect performance? Was it one
of that variety of risks which the parties were tacitly assigning
to the promisor by their failure to provide for it explicitly?...
If it could not be so considered, performance is excused. 2
The court's explicit statement of the foreseeability concept accur-
ately describes the procedure to be followed. 3 Consistent with the
Code, the court required an examination of the commercial circum-
stances of the transaction in order to determine the proper alloca-
tion of risks based on the foreseeability of the contingency.
Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School District" and Transatlantic
Financing Corp. v. United States65 exemplify a misuse of the fore-
59. Id. The court's use of the word "discernible" raises the issue of whether foreseeability
should be examined in a subjective or objective sense. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615,
Comment 4 indicates that a subjective standard was intended: "some unforeseen contin-
gency" (emphasis added). Because the Code's good faith requirements will prevent abuse of
a subjective standard, see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-203, 2-103(b), and because a
subjective standard may relieve a court from the more difficult objective determination, this
author would endorse the use of a subjective standard.
60. 310 N.E.2d 363 (Mass. 1974).
61. Id. at 368.
62. Id. at 367.
63. The only problem with the statement is the court's failure to express foreseeability in
subjective terms. See note 54 supra.
64. 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974). The plaintiff, claiming impracti-
cability of performance, brought an action for declaratory judgment seeking to terminate its
contract to supply milk to the defendant. The plaintiff argued that American grain sales to
the Soviet Union constituted a contingency rendering performance impracticable due to the
resulting price increases.
65. 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The plaintiff was suing in quantum meruit for addi-
tional expenses incurred in the performance of a shipping contract. The plaintiff's theory was
that the closing of the Suez Canal rendered performance of the contract impossible. There-
fore, he should be entitled to a quantum meruit recovery for services rendered to the defen-
dant, including the cost of sailing around the Cape of Good Hope. Because of the court's
reasoning, the opinion is valuable for purposes of evaluation even though the case was not
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seeability concept. Both courts examined the foreseeability of the
contingency in determining the validity of the excuse based upon
an allocation of risks analysis. However, after finding that the con-
tingencies were foreseeable, the courts neglected to ask the neces-
sary second question: "Was it one of that variety of risks which the
parties were tacitly assigning to the promisor by their failure to
provide for it explicitly?"6 Instead, both courts made substantially
the same conclusion:
[W]here the circumstances reveal a willingness on the part of
the seller to accept abnormal rises in costs, the question of
impracticability of performance should be judged by stricter
terms than where the contingency is totally unforeseen. 7
It is this author's contention that the foreseeability of the contin-
gency is a separate concept, not to be confused with impractica-
bility. Both concepts require examination according to § 2-615.
However, there is no basis in the language of § 2-615 for creating a
test for impracticability based on foreseeability. " The concept of
foreseeability is based upon either the preliminary restriction in §
2-615 or upon the "basic assumption" to the contract requirement
of § 2-615(a). The concept of impracticability is a separate result-
oriented requirement of § 2-615(a). While both are factual determi-
nations, the tests for the two requirements are inherently distinct.
Foreseeability is determined as of the execution of the contract;
impracticability is determined as of the time of the breach. If the
courts in Transatlantic and Maple Farms would have denied excuse
based upon the contingency being foreseeable or the performance
not being impracticable, the results would have been acceptable.
controlled by article 2 of the UCC. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615 (excuse for a
"contract for sale"); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-106(1).
66. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
67. Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School Dist., 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 1085, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784, 790
(Sup. Ct. 1974). In Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir.
1966), the court similarly stated:
The surrounding circumstances do indicate, however, a willingness by Transatlantic
to assume abnormal risks, and this fact should legitimately cause us to judge the
impracticability of performance . . . in stricter terms than we would were the contin-
gency unforeseen.
Id. at 318-19.
68. UNIFORM COMMERCIAl. CODE § 2-615(a) clearly sets forth three conditions necessary for
excuse. See text following notes 9 & 50 supra. There is no language in either the Code or the
comments supporting a combination of the conditions on a proportionate scale.
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But to place a stricter standard on impracticability in proportion to
the foreseeability of the contingency is completely inconsistent with
the Code's approach.
While impracticability is an additional vital factor which a court
should examine in determining the validity of a § 2-615 excuse," the
concept necessitates an examination independent of the other fac-
tors required by the Code.70 Unfortunately, neither the Code nor the
case law offers an adequate test for determining impracticability.
However, Comment 4 provides one major restriction to a seller alleg-
ing impracticability. This comment states: "Increased cost alone
does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due to some
unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the
performance."7' It is clear that increased cost, even if it renders
performance impracticable, will not constitute a valid excuse unless
the increased cost is the result of some unforeseen contingency.
Inherent in the concept of impracticability is the existence of a
method of performance which is in some manner more burdensome
on the seller than originally contemplated. The issue that evolves
is whether the alternative method renders performance under the
contract practicable. Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard" is the case
most often cited for the impracticability concept. There, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that a contingency which increased the
cost of performance by ten to twelve times the standard cost excused
69. If a contingency renders performance physically impossible, the issue of impractica-
bility never arises. In those situations, the concepts of foreseeability and contributory fault
will determine the validity of the excuse. See, e.g., Canadian Indus. Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar
Molasses Co., 258 N.Y. 194, 179 N.E. 383 (1932).
70. See text accompanying notes 64-68 supra.
71. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 4. The comment further states: "Nei-
ther is a rise or collapse in the market in itself a justification, for that is exactly the type of
business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are intended to cover. Id.
(emphasis added).
72. 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916). The facts of the case can be summarized as follows.
Pursuant to an agreement between the defendant and a third party, an indefinite quantity
of gravel and earth was required by the defendant. To supply this need, the defendant entered
a second agreement with the plaintiff, which provided for the defendant to remove from
plaintiff's land all of the gravel and earth required to fulfill the defendant's obligations under
the first agreement. The gravel and earth were to be paid for at specified prices. After partial
performance, it became evident that plaintiff's land contained only a portion of the necessary
gravel and earth above the water level. To remove the gravel and earth from below the water
level would have cost defendant ten to twelve times the contract price. The court held that
the existence of the necessary gravel and earth above the land was an assumption upon which
the contract was made. Therefore, the defendant was excused from performance.
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the defendant's breach of contract. In its holding, the court stated
that performance is impracticable when it can only be done at
excessive and unreasonable cost.73 The court reasoned that while
merely showing that performance would inflict a loss was not a
sufficient basis for excuse, a price increase as great as in this situa-
tion rendered performance impracticable.74
The comments to § 2-615 indicate that the excessive and unrea-
sonable cost standard as applied in Mineral Park may be more strict
than intended by the Code. Comment 4 to § 2-615 uses the phrase
"a marked increase in cost."75 Although there have been no cases
interpreting this standard,76 the general policy of the Code, to use
equitable principles in furtherance of commercial standards,77
should lead to a test less stringent than that used in Mineral Park.
In Transatlantic, although the court improperly applied the imprac-
ticability concept,7" it correctly stated the theory upon which the
concept is based.
The doctrine ultimately represents the ever-shifting line,
drawn by courts hopefully responsive to commercial practices
and mores, at which the community's interest in having con-
tracts enforced according to their terms is outweighed by the
commercial senselessness of requiring performance [or dam-
ages] ."
Recognition of this rationale should be the first step in an analysis
of impracticability. The final determination should be based on the
commercial circumstances of the transaction at issue. Included in
73. Id. at 293, 156 P. at 460.
74. Id.
75. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 4 states in part: "But a [contingency]
• . . which either causes a marked increase in cost or altogether prevents the seller from...
his performance, is within the contemplation of this section." Id. (emphasis added).
section." Id. (emphasis added).
76. It is difficult to isolate the impracticability aspect in any of the reported decisions
under the Code. There are two basic reasons for this. First, some of the cases have confused
impracticability with foreseeability. See text accompanying notes 58-62 supra. Second, the
cases dealing with the issue have merely made summary conclusions without discussing the
factors involved. See, eg., Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School Dist., 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352
N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (23"" rise in cost not impracticable).
77. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 6.
78. See text accompanying notes 65-68 supra.
79. 363 F.2d at 315. The community's interest in contract enforcement is derived from a
strong preference for commercial predictability.
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the circumstances are the following factors which this author deems
relevant to a finding of impracticability:
(1) the degree of harm to the buyer and the degree of harm
to the seller if forced to bear the loss-the extreme example
being the insolvency of one party versus a reduction in the
profits of the other;
(2) the opportunity to spread the loss-the extreme example
being a seller with one customer who is tied to a contract price
versus a buyer with a multitude of resale customers, many not
under contract;
(3) the extent, if any, of the capital investment necessary to
fulfill the contract along with the availability of the capital to
the seller and the opportunity to recover the capital investment
in the future;
(4) the general commercial expectations of the community
-for example, if the business community is generally accept-
ing price increases due to a contingency, a lesser standard of
impracticability may be applied. °
III. SUMMARY & CONCLUSION
The goal of this comment was to establish a procedure for deter-
mining the validity of an alleged § 2-615 excuse. In light of the above
analysis, the following procedure is suggested. If all of the factors
are answered favorably to the seller, a valid § 2-615 excuse is estab-
lished.
(1) Has the seller assumed an obligation to perform regardless
of the contingency?
(a) Examine the foreseeability of the contingency and its
effects as of the execution of the contract.
(2) Has a contingency occurred?
(a) Examine the circumstances surrounding the contin-
gency to determine if the seller contributed to the cause
or effect.
(3) Was the non-occurrence of the contingency a basic as-
sumption on which the contract was made?
80. These economic concepts are suggested because the doctrine of impracticability is
based on the legal recognition of commercial economic practices and mores. Similar concepts
have been applied in various areas of the law. See R. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
(1973).
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(a) Examine the foreseeability of the contingency and its
effects as of the execution of the contract.
(4) Has performance been rendered impracticable by the con-
tingency?
(a) If performance has been rendered physically impossi-
ble then it is impracticable.
(b) If an alternative method of performance is available,
examine the commercial circumstances surrounding the
alternative method, including the degree of harm to the
parties if forced to bear the loss, the opportunity to spread
the loss, the capital investment necessary to perform, and
the commercial expectations of the community.
(5) If applicable, has a fair and reasonable allocation been
made?
(a) Examine the allocation to the buyer compared to
other customers and relative to the prices being charged.
(6) Did the seller reasonably notify the buyer of the § 2-615
excuse?
If this analysis is not favorable to the seller, he should not be ex-
cused from performance.8 ' Once the excuse has been classified as
valid, the buyer will only have the options available in § 2-616:
(1) terminate the contract-affirmatively by agreement or
passively by inaction for thirty days; or
(2) if applicable, accept the allocation.
The result of the application of this approach will be to effectively
81. If the seller's allocation is not fair and reasonable, he has not established a valid § 2-
615 excuse. A strict reading of the Code would result in holding the seller liable under the
contract. However, if this is the only factor which the seller has not met, a court might more
successfully further the purposes of the Code by ordering a fair and reasonable allocation or
damages based thereon rather than damages based on the contract. The argument to the
contrary is that the Code's requirements are specific. Furthermore, the prospect of being held
for damages under the contract would act as an incentive for the seller to establish a fair and
reasonable allocation. Both arguments are convincing. Perhaps a compromise based on the
motives of the seller is in order. If the seller's motive in establishing an unfair and unreasona-
ble allocation program was to maximize his profits and thus take advantage of the contin-
gency, commercial interests would be best served by penalizing him. This type of action could
be deterred by imposing damages based on the contract price. If the seller's motives were to
actually establish a fair and reasonable allocation, and he failed because of poor business
judgment or other commercially acceptable reasons, then he should only be liable under a
fair and reasonable allocation basis and not under the contract price.
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further the Code's objectives including the use of equitable princi-
ples in furtherance of commercial standards and good faith. 2
HENRY CHAJET
82. Perhaps the most interesting and confusing aspect of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-
615 is the proposition set forth in Comment 6:
In situations in which neither sense nor justice is served by either answer when the
issue is posed in flat terms of "excuse" or "no excuse," adjustment under the various
provisions of this Article is necessary, especially the sections on good faith, on insecur-
ity and assurance and on the reading of all provisions in light of their purposes, and
the general policy of this Act to use equitable principles in furtherance of commercial
standards and good faith.
This comment indicates that a court faced with an unanswerable "excuse" or "no excuse"
situation could decree a compromise solution which would be in the best interests of justice.
For example, a court could order a price adjustment or an allocation without any finding of
excuse. In light of independent decisions made in the commercial community regarding such
compromises, this proposition is a realistic one. However, it places almost complete discretion
in the courts because of the Code's lack of guidelines in the area. This provision has not, as
yet, been employed in solving a § 2-615 problem.

